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I. Introduction
The inherent jurisdiction of the court in relation to trusts is ancient and well attested. The quotation in the title is taken from Morice v 
Bishop of Durham,1 decided in 1805:
As it is a maxim, that the execution of a trust shall be under the controul [sic] 
of the court, it must be of such a nature, that it can be under that control; so 
that the administration of it can be reviewed by the court; or, if the trustee 
dies, the court itself can execute the trust: a trust therefore, which, in case of 
maladministration could be reformed; and a due administration directed; and 
then, unless the subject and the objects can be ascertained, upon principles, 
familiar in other cases, it must be decided, that the court can neither reform 
maladministration, nor direct a due administration.2
Notwithstanding its antiquity, the court’s inherent jurisdiction has 
attracted little academic attention.3 However, it is of great importance 
to the administration of trusts and to the law of trusts generally. This 
article seeks to demonstrate the practical and theoretical significance of 
the court’s inherent jurisdiction using recent examples to show that the 
jurisdiction is very much alive and well and that an important research 
agenda flows from a proper awareness of the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
The first part of the article is a brief outline of the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction in relation to trusts, something that should be common 
knowledge to all those concerned with the law of trusts. The second part of 
1. (1805) 32 ER 947 (Ch) [Morice].
2. Ibid at 954, per Eldon LC.
3. Practitioners’ works cover the technical aspects of the subject: see David 
Hayton, Paul Matthews & Charles Mitchell, Underhill & Hayton’s The 
Law of Trusts and Trustees, 18d (London: LexisNexis, 2010) [Hayton]; and 
Lynton Tucker, Nicholas le Poidevin QC & James Brightwell, Lewin on 
Trusts, 19d (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) [Lewin].
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the article uses recent cases from England and some “offshore” jurisdictions 
to establish the continuing vitality and importance of the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction. Next, the practical importance of the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court is examined, particularly its importance in the context of 
novel developments in the law of trusts and its consequent great utility in 
the juridification of trust practice. The final part draws out the theoretical 
implications of the inherent jurisdiction and considers possibilities for 
further research. These theoretical implications touch on central areas 
of the law of trusts — theories of contractarianism, asset partitioning 
and competing perspectives on trusts — the structural importance of 
the performance interest in the law of trusts and the nature of a trust 
beneficiary’s rights. The research agenda focuses on the vital position of 
discretion in the law of trusts and what that means for future research 
and analysis.
II. An Outline of the Jurisdiction and its Practical  
Utility
The inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and all its successor 
courts in common law jurisdictions across the world, to supervise and 
if necessary intervene in the administration of trusts is an ancient and 
well-established jurisdiction of such courts. It is a jurisdiction that marks 
a radical distinction between the law of trusts and the wider law of 
obligations.
While there is no comprehensive judicial statement of the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction in relation to trusts, it may be useful to begin with 
a well-known statement of part of the jurisdiction given in Public Trustee 
v Cooper4 by Justice Hart, who was in turn quoting part of an unreported 
judgment of Justice Robert Walker (later Lord Walker) from 1995:
At the risk of covering a lot of familiar ground and stating the obvious, it seems 
to me that, when the court has to adjudicate on a course of action proposed or 
actually taken by trustees, there are at least four distinct situations (and there 
are no doubt numerous variations of those as well).
(1) The first category is where the issue is whether some proposed action is 
within the trustees’ powers. That is ultimately a question of construction of the 
4. [2001] WTLR 901 (Ch (Eng)).
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trust instrument or a statute or both. The practice of the Chancery Division 
is that a question of that sort must be decided in open court and only after 
hearing argument from both sides. It is not always easy to distinguish that 
situation from the second situation that I am coming to … [He then gave an 
example].
(2) The second category is where the issue is whether the proposed course of 
action is a proper exercise of the trustees’ powers where there is no real doubt 
as to the nature of the trustees’ powers and the trustees have decided how they 
want to exercise them but, because the decision is particularly momentous, the 
trustees wish to obtain the blessing of the court for the action on which they 
have resolved and which is within their powers. Obvious examples of that, 
which are very familiar in the Chancery Division, are a decision by trustees 
to sell a family estate or to sell a controlling holding in a family company. 
In such circumstances there is no doubt at all as to the extent of the trustees’ 
powers nor is there any doubt as to what the trustees want to do but they 
think it prudent, and the court will give them their costs of doing so, to obtain 
the court’s blessing on a momentous decision. In a case like that, there is no 
question of surrender of discretion and indeed it is most unlikely that the 
court will be persuaded in the absence of special circumstances to accept the 
surrender of discretion on a question of that sort, where the trustees are prima 
facie in a much better position than the court to know what is in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries.
(3) The third category is that of surrender of discretion properly so called. 
There the court will only accept a surrender of discretion for a good reason, 
the most obvious good reasons being either that the trustees are deadlocked 
(but honestly deadlocked, so that the question cannot be resolved by removing 
one trustee rather than another) or because the trustees are disabled as a result 
of a conflict of interest. Cases within categories (2) and (3) are similar in that 
they are both domestic proceedings traditionally heard in Chambers in which 
adversarial argument is not essential though it sometimes occurs. It may be 
that ultimately all will agree on some particular course of action or, at any 
rate, will not violently oppose some particular course of action. The difference 
between category (2) and category (3) is simply as to whether the court is 
(under category (2)) approving the exercise of discretion by trustees or (under 
category (3)) exercising its own discretion.
(4) The fourth category is where trustees have actually taken action, and that 
action is attacked as being either outside their powers or an improper exercise 
of their powers. Cases of that sort are hostile litigation to be heard and decided 
in open court. I mention that fourth category, obvious though it is, for a reason 
which will appear in a moment.5
This is certainly not the whole of the court’s inherent jurisdiction. 
5. Ibid at 922-24.
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One quite common aspect of the court’s inherent jurisdiction — not 
mentioned above — is the court’s inherent power to remove and appoint 
trustees, even contrary to the wishes of the trustees and the terms of the 
trust (if any) governing the succession of trustees.6 The court also has 
power, in an emergency, to: authorise acts of administration of the trust 
that are not otherwise authorised;7 authorise the trustees to take court 
proceedings paid out of trust funds;8 authorise as a matter of salvage, the 
expenditure of capital in keeping up the trust property, for instance by 
raising money on mortgage and spending it on repairs of the property to 
save it from ruin which would otherwise ensue;9 sanction a transaction 
which would otherwise constitute a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary 
duty;10 authorise a trustee to charge remuneration where none is provided 
by the terms of the trust or to charge remuneration in excess of that 
provided pursuant to the trust;11 authorise the maintenance of minor 
beneficiaries out of income directed to be accumulated, and even out of 
capital in some circumstances, where this course is contrary to the strict 
terms of the trust instrument and the statutory power of maintenance 
in section 31 of the Trustee Act 1925 is excluded or is otherwise not 
6. See e.g. Re Chetwynd’s Settlement, [1902] 1 Ch 692 (Eng); Re Harrison’s 
Settlement Trusts, [1965] 3 All ER 795 (Ch); and more generally Hayton, 
supra note 3 at 70.15-70.16, 71.32-71.57.
7. See e.g. Re New, [1901] 2 Ch 534 (CA (Eng)); Re Tollemache, [1903] 1 
Ch 955 (CA (Eng)); Chapman v Chapman, [1954] 1 All ER 798 (HL) 
[Chapman]; and more generally Hayton, supra note 3 at 43.20-43.25; and 
Lewin, supra note 3 at 45-50.
8. Re Beddoe, [1893] 1 Ch 547 (CA (Eng)); Evans v Evans, [1986] 3 All ER 
289; and Alsop Wilkinson v Neary, [1995] 1 All ER 431 (Ch).
9. Re Jackson, (1882) 21 Ch D 786 (Eng).
10. See e.g. Campbell v Walker (1800), 31 ER 801 (Ch); Farmer v Dean 
(1863), 55 ER 128 (Ch); Holder v Holder, [1968] 1 Ch 353 (Eng); and 
more generally John McGhee et al, Snell’s Equity 33d (London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2015) [Snell’s] at 17. See also Matthew Conaglen, “The 
Extent of Fiduciary Accounting and the Importance of Authorisation 
Mechanisms” (2011) 73:3 Cambridge Law Journal 548 at 564-73.
11. Re Duke of Norfolk’s Settlement , [1982] Ch 61 (Eng).
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applicable;12 and approve on behalf of minor, unborn and unascertained 
persons compromises of genuine disputes over the destination of trust 
property.13 There is, however, no general power to alter the terms of a 
trust because the court thinks it beneficial to do so.14
This summary of the court’s inherent jurisdiction does not purport to 
be exhaustive. It would take a full paper in itself to exhaustively describe 
the jurisdiction. But it is immediately apparent from this summary that 
the inherent jurisdiction of the court, though far from limitless, is still 
a wide and important jurisdiction. Recent cases show how flexible and 
useful this jurisdiction remains.
III. The Jurisdiction in Recent Cases: Meeting New 
Needs
The first such case to consider is Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd15 
(“Schmidt”). The question at issue in this case was quite simple. Mr. 
Schmidt’s late father had established two discretionary settlements in 
the Isle of Man. Mr. Schmidt, the appellant in the present proceedings, 
sought to obtain trust accounts and other information from the trustees 
of the two settlements. The sole trustee of each settlement was Rosewood 
Trust Ltd, the respondent in the appeal, and an Isle of Man company 
whose business was to provide corporate and trustee services. Mr. 
Schmidt brought his claim for disclosure of the trust accounts and other 
information in two capacities: first, as a personal beneficiary and second, 
as the administrator of his father’s estate which claimed an interest under 
the trusts. The claim was made in the Isle of Man and the final appeal 
12. See e.g. Re De Teissier’s Settled Estates, [1893] 1 Ch 153 (Eng); and more 
generally Snell’s, supra note 10 at 28-53.
13. Re Lord Hylton’s Settlement, [1954] 1 WLR 1055 (CA (Eng)); Chapman, 
supra note 7.
14. Chapman, supra note 7. In response to the Chapman case, statutory 
jurisdiction to approve alterations of beneficial interests on behalf of 
certain categories of people was conferred on the court by the Variation of 
Trusts Act, 1958 (UK) 6 and 7 Eliz 2, c 53; and see Hayton, supra note 3 
at 43.25.
15. [2003] UKPC 26 (Isle of Man)[Schmidt].
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of the Manx proceedings was therefore heard in the Privy Council in 
London. The Privy Council did not resolve the issues, but rather gave 
a ruling as to the correct law that the courts in the Isle of Man should 
apply to determine those issues. The importance of the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction in that ruling is apparent from the following concluding 
summary from Lord Walker’s advice:
Their Lordships have already indicated their view that a beneficiary’s right to 
seek disclosure of trust documents, although sometimes not inappropriately 
described as a proprietary right, is best approached as one aspect of the 
court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise (and where appropriate intervene 
in) the administration of trusts. There is therefore in their Lordships’ view 
no reason to draw any bright dividing-line either between transmissible and 
non-transmissible (that is, discretionary) interests, or between the rights of an 
object of a discretionary trust and those of the object of a mere power (of a 
fiduciary character).16
The key point for present purposes is not who was entitled to access 
trust documents. Rather, it is that the foundation of any such rights is the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court to determine, and if necessary compel, 
the due administration of a trust.
While Schmidt concerned trusts operating in their traditional context 
of providing for the management and distribution of family wealth over 
generations, the next case illustrates the vital contemporary importance 
of the court’s inherent jurisdiction in a commercial context. Re Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe)17 (“Lehman”) was one of the many cases 
which arose out of the collapse of Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) (“LBIE”) in the financial crisis of 2008. LBIE held a large 
amount of property on trust for thousands of clients. However, its 
record-keeping left a very great deal to be desired. When LBIE went 
into administration, it proved impossible for the administrators to work 
out which assets were held for which client. In order to resolve these 
problems, the administrators of LBIE applied to the High Court in 
London to establish whether a scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of 
the Companies Act 2006,18 which the administrators wished to promote 
16. Ibid at para 66.
17. [2009] EWHC 2141 (Ch (Comp)) [Lehman]. 
18. (UK), c 46 [Companies Act].
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between the company and certain “scheme creditors”, was one which the 
court has jurisdiction to sanction under the Companies Act. (A scheme 
of arrangement, if approved by the requisite majorities provided by the 
Companies Act and sanctioned by the court, binds all scheme creditors, 
irrespective of any particular scheme creditor’s consent.) The present 
scheme was designed to compromise and eliminate all the clients’ existing 
rights against LBIE in respect of the assets and instead give the clients the 
right to seek payment out of a fund constituted by all the assets held 
by LBIE for all the clients. Both the High Court, and subsequently the 
Court of Appeal, held that the Companies Act could not be used to give 
effect to the scheme because the Companies Act provided for schemes of 
arrangement which compromised only personal rights and any security 
for such rights; it could not be used to give effect to a scheme which 
sought to alter equitable beneficial interests in assets.
This left the administrators of LBIE in a very difficult position, and 
one to which the court was very sympathetic, even though it could not 
give effect to the administrators’ original proposal. The court did not 
want to leave the administrators with no way forward other than an 
inordinately expensive, and probably ultimately futile, forensic exercise 
of trying to identify precisely which assets were held for which client. 
Therefore, what the High Court and the Court of Appeal both did was to 
suggest that the administrators, acting on behalf of LBIE in its capacity 
as a trustee of client funds, should use and take advantage of the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction in relation to trusts:
Establishing what client assets of any given client LBIE holds or controls, what 
competing claims there may be to those assets by other clients or by LBIE (or 
others) and how LBIE and the administrators are to discharge their duties in 
respect of those assets with a view to their due distribution to those entitled to 
them are all matters where the court has, in the exercise of its trust jurisdiction, 
well-developed processes to assist the accountable trustee or other fiduciary. For 
example, the court is well used to authorising a trustee to make distribution of 
a fund where there can be no certainty that all of the claimants to it have been 
identified and the trustee desires the protection of a court order in the event 
that a further claimant should subsequently appear or matters subsequently 
come to light which question the basis on which the distribution is made. In 
one sense, dealing with the matter by recourse to the court’s assistance in this 
way can be simpler (and less costly) than the often complex processes involved 
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in the promotion of a scheme under Part 26. …19
Like Patten LJ and Blackburne J, I have some sympathy with the administrators’ 
desire to have a scheme under section 895 (of the 2006 Act) which extends to 
trust property, in the light of the difficulties which would otherwise almost 
certainly arise in connection with seeking to satisfy the rights of beneficiaries in 
relation to trust property held in the name of LBIE. However, as Blackburne J 
held, the fact that such a Scheme might well represent a reasonable proposal 
in this case is plainly not enough to bring it within the ambit of section 895, 
and, as is evidenced by the opposition to the proposed Scheme mounted by 
the London Investment Banking Association, it may, viewed in the wider 
perspective, be positively undesirable that such a Scheme could be approved 
under section 895. I hope, indeed I would expect, that, if the administrators 
decide to make an application under the Trustee Acts or pursuant to the court’s 
inherent equitable jurisdiction, in relation to dealing with beneficiaries’ rights, 
the court will provide effective assistance, by arriving at a practical and fair 
outcome, while ensuring that delay and cost are kept to a minimum.20
In this case, the administration of assets worth many millions of 
pounds by those responsible for resolving important aspects of one of 
the biggest corporate collapses in history was consigned to the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court in respect of trusts. By any standard, this was a 
significant invocation of that jurisdiction.
More recently still, the jurisdiction has been similarly deployed to 
deal with the distribution of client monies held by an investment bank 
in special administration in the case of Re Worldspreads Limited.21 The 
company, a regulated bank, had provided an online trading platform 
for spread betting and trading in contracts for differences. The company 
became insolvent and was put into “special administration”, a specialised 
form of insolvency proceeding for an insolvent investment bank.22 There 
was a large deficiency in its client account. Monies in the client account 
were held on statutory trusts.23 To cut a long story short, the statutory 
19. Lehman, supra note 17 at para 77, per Blackburne J. 
20. [2009] EWCA Civ 1161, per Longmore LJ. 
21. [2015] EWHC 1719 (Ch).
22. See the Banking Act 2009 (UK), c 1; and the Investment Bank Special 
Administration Regulations 2011 (UK), SI 2011/245.
23. See UK Financial Conduct Authority, Client Assets Rules, made in exercise 
of its powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), c 8, 
ss 137(a), 137(b).
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powers enabling an administrator to distribute the client monies in those 
circumstances proved inadequate. On application to the court, the court 
made an order exercising its inherent jurisdiction in relation to trusts 
and gave directions to the administrators (who controlled the company, 
which was trustee of the monies), authorising them to distribute the trust 
property on a particular basis, as the court was satisfied that it was just and 
expedient to make such an order in the circumstances of the insolvency.
Another commercial context in which the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction over trusts has proven very useful and able to react to 
modern developments in finance is its use by the trustees of note issues. 
Notes are often issued pursuant to the terms of a trust deed. In such 
a case, the issuer (borrower/debtor) owes sums of money (interest, and 
ultimately capital) to one or more noteholders. The issuer also promises 
to pay equivalent sums of money to, or to the order of, a trustee. The 
trustee holds the benefit of that obligation on trust for the noteholders. 
In normal (solvent) circumstances, payment to the underlying investors 
will discharge the issuer’s obligations both to the noteholder(s) and to the 
trustee, because the trustee (and, if necessary, the noteholder) will have 
directed payment to the investors until default. On default, the terms of 
the notes will prohibit separate actions by a noteholder. Instead, the trustee 
will enforce the debt owed to it for the benefit of the noteholders and 
thus the underlying investors. In effect, there will be collective realisation 
by the trustee, for the benefit of the noteholders, of the sums outstanding 
from the issuer. The trustee in these cases is usually little more than a 
cipher in economic terms.24 The trustee will very likely have some minor 
administrative discretions, but on most questions of substance, such as 
whether to waive a material breach of covenant, whether to declare an 
event of default, and whether to enforce the debt, the trustee deed will 
direct the trustee to act on the directions of the noteholders (that is, the 
beneficiaries of the trust), usually acting by some specified majority. It is 
not unusual for the trustee to be caught in between competing groups of 
noteholders (beneficiaries).
24. Consider Concord Trust v Law Debenture Trust Corporation, [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1001 at para 38; and BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v 
Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL, [2011] EWCA Civ 227 at paras 102-105.
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In those circumstances, the trustee has the great help of the 
administrative jurisdiction of the court. The trustee can apply to court 
for directions on the appropriate course of action (or the range of 
possibilities from which it may lawfully choose) and is totally protected 
from all liability if it acts in accordance with the court’s order.25 Most of 
these applications take place on short notice, often in chambers. They 
leave no record easily accessible. Various practitioners in this field in both 
the City of London and in Hong Kong have, in conversations with the 
author, attested to the importance and usefulness of the court’s inherent 
administrative jurisdiction in these circumstances. One reported example 
of this process is Citibank NA v MBIA Assurance SA.26
This case concerned one of several restructurings of debt issued by 
Eurotunnel, the builder and operator of the fixed train link between 
England and France under the English Channel. Citibank (“Citi”) 
applied for directions from the court in Citi’s capacity as trustee of a 
trust constituted by a trust deed dated 20 February 2001. This trust 
deed was itself the result of an earlier restructuring in which a company 
called FLF acquired a large tranche of Eurotunnel subordinated debt and 
paid for it by issuing seven ranked tranches of notes subject to the terms 
of the trust. The trust deed contained a covenant from FLF to pay the 
notes when due, which would then be financed out of the returns from 
the Eurotunnel debt it owned. The trust deed also provided for other 
covenants (including a covenant to pay equivalent sums to the trustee, 
or to the trustee’s order) to be held on trust for the noteholders. Futher, 
the deed provided for MBIA Assurance SA (“MBIA”) to be able to give 
directions and exercise a lot of control over what would otherwise be 
Citi’s duties and discretions as a trustee, so long as MBIA remained the 
25. See Civil Procedure Rules (UK), r 64 and its accompanying Practice 
Direction; and see generally Hayton, supra note 3. In Australia, see also Re 
Mirvac Ltd, [1999] NSWSC 457 (Austl) at paras 40-41, a case in which 
Austin J considered this jurisdiction and a parallel jurisdiction under a 
New South Wales statute.
26. [2006] EWHC 3215 (Ch). A very recent example of an alternative 
means of proceeding, namely an application for a declaration rather than 
directions, is: BNY Mellon Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v LBG Capital No 
1, [2015] EWHC 1560 (Ch).
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“Note Controlling Party”, that is, while MBIA remained liable under 
a guarantee it had given of some of the notes. When the underlying 
Eurotunnel debt was again restructured, MBIA exercised some of its 
powers under the terms of the trust to its own advantage so that it would 
be paid certain cash sums. This was challenged by other noteholders (that 
is, other beneficiaries of the trust), inter alia on the grounds that the 
trustee, if it acted in accordance with MBIA’s directions, would breach 
its duties to look after the interests of all beneficiaries. Citi, as trustee, 
applied for directions. The court held it lawful for the trustee to act in 
accordance with MBIA’s directions. If the express terms of the trust make 
a beneficiary’s rights subject to the effect of such a direction, those express 
terms cannot be overridden or altered by some alleged “duty of fairness” 
to those beneficiaries.
What is important for present purposes is the availability of the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction to give directions and thereby resolve the trustee’s 
concerns. The court laid to rest a major financial question affecting notes 
worth in aggregate some £432,050,000 plus €745,000,000 and did so 
in a very short time. The originating process seeking the directions was 
issued on 20 November 2006. The Chancery Division of the High Court 
in London gave judgment on 13 December 2006; and on 22 January 
2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the High Court’s 
judgment. The whole process, from start to finish, took just nine weeks, 
including the Christmas and New Year vacation periods.
Cases from recent years in another area of law, this time in the 
traditional context of family wealth management, also illustrate the 
flexibility of the court’s inherent jurisdiction and its enduring vitality. 
The cases in question concern protectors and they show the continuing 
ability of the inherent jurisdiction to cope with novel situations.
In English law, the term “protector” is not a term of art, though 
it is sometimes used as a defined term in the trust legislation of some 
(often offshore) jurisdictions.27 All it means, essentially, is a person who 
is not acting as a trustee but who nevertheless has certain powers in 
relation to the administration and/or distribution of a trust fund and 
27. See e.g. Trustee Act 1998 (Bahamas), c 176, ss 3, 81.
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may or may not be acting as a fiduciary in relation to those powers.28 
Other words are sometimes used to describe the person in this situation, 
such as “supervisor” or “special appointor”, but nothing turns on the 
nomenclature for present purposes. What is significant is the court’s use 
and development of its inherent jurisdiction over trusts to supervise and 
control protectors, and, when necessary, to intervene in the administration 
of the trust where its provisions for protectors have for some reason failed 
to work as anticipated.
In Steele v Paz Ltd,29 a Manx appellate court had to consider a trust 
where the protector’s consent was required for payments of income and 
capital and for the exercise by the trustees of a number of administrative 
powers.  The protector also had power to appoint new or additional 
trustees.  Unfortunately no protector was appointed when the trust 
was created and an issue arose as to whether the trust was therefore 
invalid. The court held that the position of protector in that trust was 
fiduciary and that the court could accordingly appoint a protector with 
fiduciary powers in the same way that it could appoint a trustee in order 
to prevent a trust from failing for want of a trustee.
In Re Freiburg Trust30 (“Freiburg”), the Jersey Royal Court held that 
the protector of the trust, whose consent was required for the exercise by 
the trustees of a number of their powers, including payments of income 
or capital, was in the position of a fiduciary. The court, accordingly, could 
remove him pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction, and did so, because 
he had been convicted of offences of fraud in Belgium (including 
misappropriation of monies from the Freiburg Trust itself ), had been 
sentenced in his absence to a term of imprisonment and had disappeared.
A final, more recent example is the Jersey case of In the Matter of the 
A and B Trusts.31 Much of the factual background of the case was not 
28. See e.g. Kan Lai Kwan v Poon Lok To Otto, [2014] HKCFA 65 at para 67, 
per Gummow NPJ, citing with approval Matthew Conaglen & Elizabeth 
Weaver, “Protectors as Fiduciaries: Theory and Practice” (2012) 18:1 
Trusts & Trustees 17.
29. [1995] Manx LR 426 (Isle of Man) [Steel]. 
30. [2004] JRC 056.
31. [2012] JRC 169A.
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reported publicly for reasons of confidentiality. The court only authorised 
the publication of an extract from its judgment. In short, the applicants, 
who were the overwhelming majority of the adult beneficiaries of two 
Jersey discretionary trusts had lost confidence in the protector of the two 
trusts. Relationships between the parties had completely broken down, 
principally because the protector conceived of his role as ensuring that 
the wishes of the settlors were carried out, rather than upholding the 
interests of the beneficiaries at all times. The court ordered removal of the 
protector, exercising its inherent jurisdiction, because the protector had 
fundamentally misconceived his role. Though the protector’s motivation 
for the way he exercised his role was bona fide, his role, ascertained from 
the terms of settlement, was to protect the beneficiaries’ interests, not 
those of the settlors. It was also open to the settlors to specify a different 
role for the protector. It was common ground between the parties that the 
court had an inherent jurisdiction to remove a protector from office, akin 
to its power to remove a trustee from office,32 and that the jurisdiction 
was an aspect of the court’s inherent jurisdiction over the administration 
of trusts. The new development in the case is that the court made it 
clear that the jurisdiction could be exercised well beyond the extreme 
circumstances of cases such as Freiburg; the protector’s mistaken view of 
his role, the breakdown in relations with so many beneficiaries, and the 
prejudice that caused to the administration of the trust, warranted his 
removal from office.
However, the inherent jurisdiction of the court has not been seen 
as entirely helpful. It has been seen by some as standing in the way of 
provision in a trust deed for mandatory arbitration of trust disputes. The 
argument, though it is contested, is that the inherent jurisdiction of the 
court cannot be ousted, so any provision of the trust requiring mandatory 
arbitration to the exclusion of court proceedings would necessarily be an 
attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the court in a manner which is not 
permissible and therefore void. The consequence would be that primary 
legislation would be required to authorise the mandatory arbitration of 
trust disputes. Certainly, this appears to be the view of the well-respected 
32. Supra note 6.
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Trust Law Committee as expressed in the journal of the Society of Trust 
and Estates Practitioners.33
Whatever the precise strength of this argument, it undoubtedly has 
a chilling effect on the adoption of arbitration for disputes arising under 
a trust deed. Yet for the reasons seen above, those who might seek to 
oust the inherent jurisdiction of the court should be careful what they 
wish for. The inherent jurisdiction is extremely flexible and useful, and 
ousting it could well result in a disadvantage to trustees and beneficiaries. 
For that reason alone, it seems preferable to provide for the arbitration of 
trust disputes, if desired, by carefully drafted legislation that preserves the 
advantages of access to court for guidance, directions and assistance, even 
if it invests the resolution of disputes in an arbitral tribunal. For present 
purposes, it is only fair to note that some practitioners indeed see some 
downside in the existence and availability of the inherent jurisdiction of 
the court, because of the doubt that jurisdiction casts on the effectiveness 
of arbitration clauses in trusts.
IV. Theory
It is surprising, given the ubiquity and importance of the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court over the administration and execution of trusts, 
that this jurisdiction has not attracted more academic attention. In 
England, this may be the consequence of so much academic attention 
being focused on implied trusts and their place in the taxonomy of 
the law, rather than on the express trust as a voluntary, substantive 
and functionally important legal institution used in a whole range of 
circumstances, many of them far removed from the origins of the trust in 
the intergenerational management of primarily land-based family wealth. 
In North America there has been, in recent years, renewed interest in 
33. Trust Law Committee, “Arbitration of Trust Disputes” (2012) 18:4 
Trusts and Trustees 296. For a thorough review of the law, see Matthew 
Conaglen, “The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Trusts” (2015) 
74:3 Cambridge Law Journal 450.
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the trust as an organisational form and in legal theorising of this form.34 
But still, the existence and impact of the inherent jurisdiction has not 
featured much in these debates.
In fact, the existence of the inherent jurisdiction has significant 
theoretical ramifications in the law of trusts. At the risk of oversimplification, 
trust law has been seen as primarily about asset partitioning (essentially a 
matter of property law),35 or contractarian freedom of management and 
disposition of trust assets (essentially a matter of the law of voluntary 
obligations — contract law in the economic, rather than the strictly legal 
sense),36 or else, most persuasively, as a matter of organisational law.37 The 
existence of the inherent jurisdiction challenges these simplicities. The 
inherent jurisdiction is a matter of positive law, not replicable by contract, 
and yet it is not concerned with asset partitioning, the traditionally 
conceived function of mandatory (property) rules in the law of trusts.
For example, it would be impossible by private bargain to provide 
for authoritative guidance and directions the effect of which, if followed, 
would be to insulate the trustee from all potential liability. At present, 
positive law in England would most likely forbid this as an impermissible 
ouster of the jurisdiction of the court.38 But even if that were changed 
34. See e.g. John H Langbein, “The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts” 
(1995) 105:3 Yale Law Journal 625 [Langbein, “The Contractarian 
Basis”]; Henry B Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, “The Functions of Trust Law: 
A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis” (1998) 73:2 New York 
University Law Review 434 [Hansmann & Mattei, “Functions of Trust 
Law”]; Henry B Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law” (2000) 110:3 Yale Law Journal 387 [Hansmann & 
Kraakman, “The Essential Role”]; Henry B Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman 
& Richard Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm” (2006) 119:5 Harvard 
Law Review 1333 [Hansmann et al, “Rise of the Firm”]; and Robert 
Sitkoff, “An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law” (2004) 89:3 Cornell Law 
Review 621.
35. Hansmann & Mattei, “Functions of Trust Law”, supra note 34 at 454-59, 
479. 
36. Langbein, “The Contractarian Basis”, supra note 34 at 650.
37. Hansmann & Kraakman, “The Essential Role”, supra note 34 at 393-95; 
and Hansmann et al, “Rise of the Firm”, supra note 34 at 1337-56.
38. Steel, supra note 29.
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by statute, which is possible,39 no tribunal can make itself immune from 
review by the courts. So the finality of any ruling by such a tribunal 
binding under the (now permitted) terms of a trust would always be 
subject to review. Only the state, through positive law, can provide 
complete finality, which trustees enjoy when acting in accordance with 
the directions of the court. It would be similarly impossible to provide 
for a body that will provide long stop enforcement of a trust, come what 
may. And private parties, by bargain, could not replicate the powers of 
the court to intervene in the administration of the trust, for example by 
removing trustees and appointing new ones, or by authorising deviations 
from the terms of the trust. Again, while in theory such powers could 
be conferred by the terms of a trust on a tribunal, the actions of such 
a tribunal would be open to review, and it would require the assistance 
of the state’s (most likely the court’s) coercive powers in order to secure 
compliance with its orders should they not be given effect willingly. 
In short, these forms of assistance offered by the court cannot be fully 
replicated by private bargain.
In theory, the role of the court in the Lehman litigation might just 
have been replicated by contract. But in practical terms, there was no such 
chance of a purely contractual solution, which was the very reason why 
the administrators had proposed a scheme of arrangement. There were so 
many people who were creditors or beneficiaries or both of the relevant 
LBIE entity that there was no practical possibility whatsoever of them 
all agreeing to a particular proposal for administering the funds held for 
their benefit. Indeed, even the administrators’ proposal for a scheme of 
arrangement, which essentially saw the rights of LBIE’s customers as in 
personam obligations (whether strictly contractual or not) nevertheless 
required the assistance of statute law and the intervention of the courts, 
through which the majority could be made to bind all the customers, if 
it were to be remotely feasible. In that event, the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court was used to achieve what in practical terms could not be 
achieved by private bargain alone.
The court’s inherent jurisdiction is also important at the structural 
39. See e.g. Trusts Law 2007 (Guernsey), c 2, s 63.
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level of the law of trusts. Rules such as the requirements of “certainty 
of subject matter”40 and “certainty of objects”41 find their origin and 
justification in the court’s inherent jurisdiction. These rules show distinct 
structural differences from their analogues in the law of contract and 
those differences are a consequence of the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
The law of trusts, like the law of contract, requires certainty of 
intention. This is no more than a way of saying, in doctrinal terms, that 
there needs to be a sufficient and objective manifestation that the parties 
wish to create a particular form of legal relationship to which the organs 
of state, principally the courts, will then respond.
But the law of trusts is much more rigorous than the law of contract 
in its requirements that the subject matter of the trust be accurately 
identified or identifiable and that the beneficiaries of the trust likewise 
be clearly identified or identifiable. Contracts to deal with assets do not 
necessarily require that the assets be immediately identified or identifiable 
on formation of the contract; it is generally sufficient that the assets be 
identified on performance of the contract.42
In theoretical terms, it is the remedial structure of the law of contract 
which admits the more liberal rules on certainty. The courts do not 
need to know so much about what assets are in question if all they are 
required to do is award damages if assets of a particular description are 
not ultimately delivered as agreed. Correspondingly, the courts need to 
40. See e.g. Sprange v Barnard (1789), 2 Bro CC 585 (Ch (Eng)); Knight v 
Knight (1840), 3 Beav 148 (Ch (Eng)); Boyce v Boyce (1849), 16 Sim 476 
(Ch (Eng)); Palmer v Simmonds (1854), 2 WR 313 (Ch (Eng)); Mussoorie 
Bank Ltd v Raynor (1882), 7 App Cas 321 (Ch (Eng)); Re Kayford Ltd, 
[1975] 1 All ER 604 (Ch); Re London Wine Co (Shippers) Ltd, [1986] 
PCC 121 (HC (Eng)); Hunter v Moss, [1994] 1 WLR 452 (CA (Civ)
(Eng)); Re Harvard Securities Ltd (1997), 2 BCLC 369 (Ch (Eng)); and 
White v Shortall, [2006] NSWSC 1379 (Austl), aff’d [2007] NSWCA 372 
(Austl) [Shortall] (approved by the Court of Appeal in Lehman, supra note 
17). See generally Hayton, supra note 3 at 8.11-8.33.
41. See e.g. Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement Trusts, [1970] AC 508 (HL) 
[Gulbenkian’s]; and McPhail v Doulton, [1971] AC 424 (HL) [McPhail]. 
See generally Hayton, supra note 3 at 8.34-8.70.
42. See generally Gareth Jones & William Goodhart, Specific Performance 
(London: Butterworths, 1996) at 9-11.
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know more if they are to be able and willing to order parties to deal with 
particular assets and subject them to penalties, including contempt of 
court, should they not do so.
The law of trusts therefore requires that trustees should know ab 
initio what the assets to be held on trust are, or to be able to ascertain that 
immediately,43 again because of the (different) remedial structure of the 
law of trusts. Axiomatically, the law of trusts requires trustees to execute 
the trust, rather than merely pay compensation in respect of their failure 
to execute the trust. Ultimately, and equally axiomatically, the court 
will execute the trust if the current trustees fail to do so, whether acting 
itself or through the appointment of new trustees.44 These axiomatic 
propositions require much more information to be available if they are 
to be realised. In other words, axiomatic doctrines which form part of 
the court’s inherent jurisdiction are responsible for the tighter certainty 
requirements of the law of trusts as opposed to the law of contract.
Similar points can be made in connection with the rules on certainty 
of objects. The rules are not just about ascertainment of those who have 
locus standi to enforce the trust. If they were, then it would be very 
difficult to argue with the proposition that identification of a single such 
beneficiary would be sufficient to validate the trust, a proposition that 
was rejected decades ago in Re Gulbenkian’s Settlement Trusts.45 While the 
rules are designed to make sure that the trustees can execute the trust 
rather than pay compensation in respect of a failure to execute it, they 
are also designed to enable the court to execute the trust, or bring about 
43. Langbein, “The Contractarian Basis”, supra note 34 at 650. The statement 
in the text is consistent with the interpretation given to Hunter v Moss, 
[1994] 1 WLR 452 (CA (Civ)(Eng)), and in the Australian case of 
Shortall, supra note 40, which in turn was itself approved in England by 
the Court of Appeal in Lehman, supra note 17.
44. Morice, supra note 1. Note also Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts, [1952] Ch 534 
(Eng) at 549; McPhail, supra note 41 at 439-40; McLean v Burns Philp 
Trustee Co Pty Ltd (1985), 2 NSWLR 623 (SC (Austl)) at 633, 637; Re 
Rabaiotti 1989 Settlement [2000], WTLR 953 (Royal Court (Jersey)) at 
970; Schmidt, supra note 15 at paras 36, 51, 66; and Crociani v Crociani, 
[2014] UKPC 40 (Jersey) at para 36 [Crociani].
45. Gulbenkian’s, supra note 41.
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its execution, should the current trustees fail to do so.46 The theoretical 
implications are the same as those flowing from the rules about certainty 
of subject matter. The axiomatic rule that a trust will, if necessary, be 
executed by the court or at its direction, generates the strict — or at the 
very least stricter — requirements in the law of trusts for information 
about the identity of beneficiaries.
The court’s inherent jurisdiction also offers theoretical insights to 
counterbalance the undoubted insights of contractarianism.47 Unlike 
contracts, trusts proceed from the axiom that the court will compel a 
trustee to perform his or her undertaking, regardless of any question of 
the adequacy of monetary compensation for non-performance, as was 
noted earlier. Trusts assume the “good person” theory of obligations 
(where the “good person” does faithfully as he or she is bound to in 
accordance with the terms or purposes of the trust), rather than a “bad 
person” theory (where he or she is allowed to breach his duties at the 
price of paying money). The relevance of this to remedies for breach 
of trust and their quantification has been explored elsewhere.48 But the 
interest of trust law in performance has implications well beyond the law 
of remedies for breach of trust.
This interest in performance, if it is to be realised consistently in 
practice, necessitates some means of keeping the trust operating for its 
proper purposes in circumstances even where the beneficiaries are not all 
ascertained and sui juris — capable of reforming the administration of 
the trust themselves by consensual action. Even if the law allowed other 
mechanisms of enforcement, they too could break down. The court’s 
inherent jurisdiction provides the necessary support that guarantees 
performance and execution of the trust. The court’s inherent jurisdiction 
provides a kind of state-backed regulatory oversight of, and support for, 
the trust. As such, the court’s inherent jurisdiction could not be replicated 
by private bargain. That fact provides a necessary corrective to an 
46. Morice, supra note 1.
47. See Langbein, “The Contractarian Basis”, supra note 34 at 629.
48. See e.g. David Hayton, “The Development of Equity and the ‘Good 
Person’ Philosophy in Common Law Systems” (2012) 76 The 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 263.
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excessively contractarian understanding of trusts. Trusts certainly exhibit 
similarities to contract — they respond to private bargaining and so are 
very flexible — but trusts are not contracts. Contractarianism provides 
one important perspective on trusts, but it is not the only perspective 
and must certainly not imply an identity between trusts and contracts. 
But equally, the court’s inherent jurisdiction should remain deferential to 
the terms of the trust as established by the settlor; respect for voluntary 
undertakings should be maintained. The court’s inherent jurisdiction can 
usefully aid the execution of voluntary undertakings and help them cope 
with unexpected events and maladministration; but, as hitherto, a court 
should not alter the terms of a trust simply because it thinks that it is 
beneficial to do so.49
A recent case from the Privy Council, Crociani v Crociani,50 
emphasises that the involvement of the court in the affairs of a trust is 
an important factor distinguishing trust from true contract. The Privy 
Council indicated that it would approach a jurisdiction clause in a trust 
differently from an equivalent clause in a contract, because of the court’s 
concern for the beneficiaries’ interests. In other words, beneficiaries are 
not treated just like a third-party beneficiary of a contract stricto sensu, 
or the assignee of the benefit of a contract. Clearly, execution of the 
undertaking as mandated by the settlor is key to the law of trusts. But 
the court’s approach to interpretation, like the court’s jurisdiction to aid 
and supplement the trustees’ execution of the trust, is used to advance the 
beneficiaries’ interests more firmly than those of a third party beneficiary 
of a contract or an assignee of the benefit of a contract. The Crociani 
case confirms from the perspective of interpretation what is also clear 
from the inherent jurisdiction: an unsophisticated equivalence between 
trust and contract is entirely inappropriate, even when considering the 
rights and duties of trustees and beneficiaries inter se, quite aside from 
any consideration of the proprietary aspects of a trust.
More fundamentally still, in theoretical terms, the very 
conceptualisation of an interest under a trust must accommodate and 
49. Supra notes 13, 14. 
50. Crociani, supra note 44.
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reflect the implications of the court’s inherent jurisdiction. An interest 
under a trust had its origins in the jurisdiction of the Chancellor, and 
later his court, and these origins are still visible. An interest under a trust, 
while it may be conceptualised as a single interest, is a complex of juridical 
components. The interest will involve proprietary aspects — the right to 
maintain and when necessary restore the integrity of the trust fund — as 
well as claims on the trustee by way of obligation.51 But that interest also 
still crucially involves the holder’s — the beneficiary’s — right to invoke 
the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The non-proprietary aspects of 
the interest cannot simply be reduced to nothing more than a series of 
obligations owed to the holder of the interest. Of course, this is not to 
say that in a modern conceptualisation of a trust, such obligations do not 
exist, far from it. It is simply to emphasise that they are not the whole of 
the interest-holder’s rights.
For example, the ability of the court to intervene in the administration 
of a trust when necessary to give guidance, to rule on the exercise of 
powers, to appoint new trustees and to permit departure from fiduciary 
and other rules, cannot all be conceptualised as obligations owed by the 
trustees. Nor are they in any sense rights of property. Nor could they 
be practically replicated by private bargain. And in some cases, such as 
the ability of the court to provide authoritative directions immunising 
the trustees from liability if they act within those directions, they could 
not be replicated by private bargain even in theory, because these rules 
depend on the state’s unique ability to quieten disputes with finality 
and, when necessary, exercise coercive force to achieve such finality. A 
beneficiary’s right to invoke the court’s inherent jurisdiction is sui generis.
The court’s inherent jurisdiction will inevitably involve an element 
of discretion. Discretion in the decisions of courts, particularly equitable 
discretion, has been roundly condemned by, amongst others, the late 
51. Richard Nolan, “Equitable Property” (2006) 122:2 Law Quarterly Review 
232.
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Professor Birks.52 Yet the experience of social practice — the day to day 
activities of the courts — suggest that such discretion is not and need not 
be arbitrary and lacking in any predictability. Its existence is practically 
inevitable and, it seems, theoretically unavoidable.
Even a cursory survey of the court’s inherent jurisdiction makes 
it very clear that the jurisdiction can be invoked in a large number of 
different circumstances and for a large number of different purposes. 
The court, in exercising its inherent jurisdiction, has to encompass a vast 
range of possibilities. The idea that enough fixed rules could be developed 
to deal with each one within that vast range to come before the court 
is self-evidently absurd. Any purported rule would soon become the 
subject of so many glosses, carve-outs and exceptions necessary to cope 
with changed circumstance that the process would amount in substance 
to the application of discretion but without the clarity of calling it such. 
In other words, discretion is practically inevitable as a component of the 
court’s inherent jurisdiction.
Indeed, it is noticeable that the courts rely on equitable discretion 
when intervening in organisations to cope with the unexpected and 
the unanticipated and the breakdown of relationships even in other 
areas than the court’s inherent jurisdiction over trusts. In these areas, 
the court’s involvement in the organisation is rather less intense than 
its inherent jurisdiction over trusts: in these areas, the court sticks to 
resolving disputes, and, where necessary, arranging for the dissolution of 
the organisation, but does not offer the range of assistance, guidance and 
ultimately administration of the organisation that are part of the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction over trusts.
A good example of the court’s equitable discretion outside the 
law of trusts is the court’s jurisdiction to wind up unincorporated 
52. See e.g. the unrestrained criticism in Peter Birks, “Three Kinds of 
Objection to Discretionary Remedialism” (2000) 29:1 The University 
of Western Australia Law Review 1. Compare and contrast Paul Finn, 
“Equitable Doctrine and Discretion in Remedies”, ch 17 in WR Cornish 
et al, eds, Restitution Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth 
Jones (Oxford: Hart, 1998) at 251.
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associations and partnerships.53 Where statute law has created new forms 
of organisations, such as the company limited by shares or by guarantee, 
statute, from very early on, had to provide discretion for the court to 
wind up such companies,54 and later found it necessary to confer further 
discretion to allow the court to deal with disputes between members 
without necessarily winding up the company.55 So even in statute law 
dealing with organisations, giving discretion to the courts was seen as 
necessary from the beginning, and the scope of that discretion only 
grew with time. Both practicality and history seem to suggest that such 
discretion is unavoidable and necessary when a court becomes involved 
in the administration of an organisation.
But this discretion certainly does not entail chaotic unpredictability 
in legal relations between the members of the organisation. Lawyers are 
perfectly capable of advising in such disputes, as patterns of circumstance, 
behaviour and judicial response allow the lawyers to predict and advise 
with a considerable degree of probability, if not complete certainty. 
Further, it should be remembered that purportedly fixed rules, which 
can nevertheless be manipulated and distinguished, are themselves far 
from entirely certain in their application. It is primitive and naive, indeed 
misleading, to set up a bipolar distinction between “rules” as certain and 
“discretion” as chaotic.
The same points can be made in theoretical terms. Given the 
multiplicity of parties and circumstances that may come before the court 
in its inherent jurisdiction over trusts, some of which are noted above, it 
53. The jurisdiction of the court in relation to partnerships originated in 
equity but was later codified in statute as section 35 of the Partnership 
Act, 1890 (UK), c 53, 54 Vict, 39. See Roderick l’Anson Banks, Lindley 
& Banks on Partnership 19d (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) at 1-01, 
1-04-1-06, 1-13. The jurisdiction over unincorporated associations which 
are not partnerships remains a matter of the court’s inherent equitable 
jurisdiction: Re William Denby Sick and Benevolent Fund, [1971] 1 WLR 
973 (Ch (Eng)); and Re GKN Bolts & Nuts Ltd (Automotive Division) 
Birmingham Works Sports and Social Club, [1982] 1 WLR 774 (Ch (Eng)).
54. Companies Act, 1862 (UK), c 39, s 79(5).
55. Companies Act, 1948 (UK), c 38, s 210, and its much modified successors, 
culminating in the current Companies Act, supra note 18 at ss 944 et seq.
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would be impossible for a court composed of human beings with limited 
information and bounded rationality to be capable of prospectively 
structuring rules to cope with every one of those parties and every one of 
those circumstances.
What this means is that any attempt to eliminate the element of the 
court’s discretion from the law of trusts and the rights of beneficiaries is 
doomed to failure. Any such attempt would be doomed simply because 
of the court’s involvement in the affairs of a complex organisation, 
as illustrated above. However the intensity of the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction over trusts — that is, the much greater extent to which a 
court will positively become involved in the administration of a trust than 
the administration of any other organisation such as an unincorporated 
association, a partnership or a company — serves further to emphasise 
the inevitability of discretion in the administration of trusts and the 
corresponding inevitability of access to the court’s discretion as an aspect 
of a beneficiary’s rights.
V. Conclusion: A Research Agenda
A richer and more complete understanding of discretion is therefore a 
vital step in the study of the law of trusts. Discretion is not going to go 
away, notwithstanding a strong strain of academic distaste for discretion 
at least in England, particularly a distaste for equitable discretion.56
So what of future research? In 1956, while a visitor at Harvard 
Law School, the leading Oxford scholar of jurisprudence, Professor 
HLA Hart, considered the question of discretion in a presentation to 
the Harvard Law School Faculty. The text of that presentation was lost 
until very recently, but has now finally been published.57 We need to 
56. Birks, supra note 52.
57. HLA Hart, “Discretion” (2013) 127:2 Harvard Law Review 652. 
Professor Hart’s own text is accompanied by two fascinating essays about 
his once lost, now recovered, concern with discretion: Nicola Lacey, “The 
Path Not Taken: HLA Hart’s Harvard Essay on Discretion” (2013) 127:2 
Harvard Law Review 636; and Geoffrey C Shaw, “HLA Hart’s Lost Essay: 
Discretion and the Legal Process School” (2013) 127:2 Harvard Law 
Review 666.
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take forward its stalled agenda, and move beyond the unsophisticated 
excoriation of discretion.
One of the key aspects of Hart’s consideration of discretion was his 
awareness of the widely varying circumstances in which discretion may 
be deployed. It is certainly not just a matter for a court. In the context of 
trust law, discretion is often vitally important in the decisions of trustees 
and others involved in the administration of trusts such as a protector. 
In all these contexts, we need a clear understanding of what distinguishes 
discretion both from rules and from arbitrary decisions. It is trite to say 
that trustees and protectors must not make arbitrary decisions,58 but 
what precisely is “arbitrary” and to what extent does the nature of what 
is “arbitrary” vary, depending on the identity and duties of the decision-
maker? And equally, we need to consider the limits of discretion and how 
it is to be controlled and reviewed without being abolished.
When the consideration of discretion focuses on the court, much 
broader questions emerge. The first, and so far unarticulated question, 
is the nature of the court’s discretion in the context of the inherent 
jurisdiction: to what extent is it exercising administrative (or executive) 
discretion and to what extent is it exercising judicial discretion? In other 
words, to what extent is the court using its discretion to decide how a 
trust should be run, if necessary adjudicating between competing points 
of view as to what is appropriate or desirable, and to what extent is it 
adjudicating a disputed point of law, or claims to some entitlement 
pursuant to an obligation or a proprietary interest? The well known 
debate between Hart and Dworkin focused very much on the latter 
form of judicial discretion, that is, discretion in the interpretation, and 
possibly creation, of rules and discretion in the adjudication of claims to 
58. See e.g. Re Manisty’s Settlement, [1974] Ch 17 (Eng) at 26, per Templeman 
J.
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some entitlement.59
To the extent that the discretion of the court’s inherent jurisdiction 
is administrative in nature, it raises questions about the role of discretion 
in the very structure of the trust as a juridical institution and about the 
impact of that discretion on the nature of the rights and duties which 
arise under a trust, given that access to the discretionary remedies of the 
court is a fundamental aspect of a beneficiary’s rights. Administrative 
discretion vested in a court also raises questions about the nature of courts 
and judging. To the extent that they exercise administrative discretion, 
courts and judges are not solely concerned with the resolution of disputes 
and the interpretation and application of rules. What does that imply 
for the idea of “access to justice”: does the idea include access to such 
administrative functions of the courts?
To the extent that the discretion of the court’s inherent jurisdiction is 
truly judicial — not merely the exercise of discretion by a judge, but the 
exercise of discretion in the interpretation of application of rules, or in the 
adjudication of claims to some entitlement — then that discretion does 
raise questions about the nature of judicial discretion, its legitimacy and 
its relation to the rule of law. These questions are the more familiar stuff 
of the debate between Hart and Dworkin. And though these questions 
arise principally in relation to judicial discretion, they do nevertheless 
still arise in connection with a court’s administrative discretion, though 
perhaps not in such an acute form.
These broad questions may seem a long way removed from an area 
of doctrine that is often seen as dry and merits little academic attention, 
that is, the inherent jurisdiction of the court over the administration and 
execution of trusts. But they are the inevitable consequence of what is a 
59. See Ronald Dworkin, “Judicial Discretion” (1963) 60 Journal of 
Philosophy 624, which was published seven years after Hart had presented 
his work on discretion at Harvard, but long before the work’s publication. 
Hart returned to the debate, particularly in the postscript to The Concept 
of Law, 2d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Dworkin returned 
often to the debate in his later works. See generally Scott Shapiro, The 
“Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed (Ripstein, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 22-55. 
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vital and important jurisdiction.
